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THE DEBATE ON BEGRIFFSTHEORIE BETWEEN CASSIRER,
MARC-WOGAU – AND SCHLICK
0. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a peculiar debate between Ernst  Cassirer 
and the Swedish philosopher Konrad  Marc-Wogau on Begriffstheorie that took 
place in the late thirties of the 20th century. This debate may be conceived as sort of 
ersatz of the discussion between Cas sirer’s Neokantian Begriffstheorie on the one 
hand, and logical empiricist accounts on the other, in particular Schlick’s Begriffs-
theorie as presented in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre.1 Although  Schlick did not 
participate in personam in the discussion that took place between Cassirer and 
Marc-Wogau, one may consider him as a “virtual” participant of the debate, since 
his Begriffstheorie played an important role in the background, in particular for 
Cassirer. More precisely, I’d like to show that the debate can be read as a dispute 
on the feasibility of a “rich” account of Begriffstheorie, favored by Cassirer, and 
the necessity of restricting Begriffstheorie to an “austere” approach whose pro-
tagonists were Marc-Wogau and Schlick, although in a quite different ways.
More generally, the debate on Begriffstheorie exemplifi es the complex inter-
actions – and non-interactions – between three important currents of scientifi c 
philosophy, namely, the Marburg Neokantianism of Cassirer, the scientifi cally 
minded philo so phers of the Uppsala School, and, indirectly, the Logical Empiri-
cism of the Vienna Circle.
To set the stage, fi rst let us recall briefl y some bi o gra phical details of the 
protagonists. After National Socialism had come to power in January 1933, Cas-
sirer left Germany in April of the same year. First he went to England, in 1934 he 
settled down in Uppsala. When in 1941 a German invasion of Sweden seemed 
imminent, he went to the U.S. where he lived until his death in April 1945. Konrad 
Marc-Wogau (1902 – 1991) was Professor of Philo sophy in Uppsala from 1946 till 
his retire ment in 1968. During Cassirer’s stay in Sweden he and Cassirer were en-
gaged in a lively debate that mainly took place in the then newly founded journal 
Theoria. From 1936 to 1940 their exchange in Theoria comprises at least seven 
items. Moreover, already in 1936 Marc-Wogau had published the monograph In-
halt und Umfang des Begriffs in which he dealt with a variety of Begriffstheorien, 
1 Another important current of Begriffstheorie fl ourishing in the Vienna Circle was the 
one put forward by Car nap in the Aufbau. For reasons of space I cannot deal with it 
here.
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among them Cassirer’s. He found all of them wanting, since they all led to “dia-
lectical”, i.e., inconsistent concepts of concepts.
For  Cassirer Begriffstheorie, i.e., the philosophical theory of the formation of 
scientifi c concepts, was not just one philosophical topic among others. Rather, he 
considered Begriffstheorie as a truly central point of philosophy überhaupt (cf. 
Cassirer 1928, 163).  Marc-Wogau agreed with Cassirer on the importance of the 
Begriffsproblem. He was well aware of the fact that he did not attack some mi-
nor point of Cassirer’s approach, but launched an assault against the very center 
of Cassirer’s philosophy. Moreover, he conceived his attack not only as directed 
against Cassirer’s theory, but against the traditional philosophical account of con-
cepts as a whole.
In the background of the debate on Begriffstheorie between Cassirer and 
Marc-Wogau,  Schlick and his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre played an important 
role. Marc-Wogau claimed that Cassirer’s Begriffstheorie could not survive logi-
cal analysis in that it led to an inconsistent notion of the concept. Although in 
Inhalt und Umfang he did not deal with Schlick’s account of Begriffstheorie as 
elaborated in Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre it transpires from his criticisms of the 
other theories of concepts treated that he would have judged Schlick’s account as 
“dialectical”, i.e., as inconsistent, as well.
On the other hand, Cassirer held Schlick’s Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre in high 
esteem as a step in the right direction (cf. Cassirer 1927), but he criticized Schlick 
in that he took Begriffe as merely conventional symbols, laying “stress only on the 
negative moment of the function of “denoting” and its “conventional” character.” 
According to him, “a sharper analysis of this function discovers immediately an-
other, more positive aspect. (Cassirer 1927, 136). This “more positive aspect” of 
the symbolic character of scientifi c concepts he claimed to have unfolded in his 
constitutive account of Begriffstheorie as pre sented in Substance and Function 
(Cassirer 1910) and later in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (Cassirer 1923 – 
1929). Complementarily, Schlick, in Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, criticized (Ne o-) 
Kan tian accounts of Begriffstheorie as overstating the power of thinking without 
men ti o ning Cassirer by name. He pithily asserted:
Thinking does not create the relations of reality… [R]eality does not obtain form and regu-
larity fi rst from con sci ous ness; on the contrary, consciousness is only a section cut out of 
reality. … There are no synthetic judgments a priori. (GTK, §40)
For Schlick, Begriffe were merely conventional symbols. In this sense, he sub-
scribed to a rather austere version of Begriffstheorie. But even this kind of modest 
theory Marc-Wogau would have blamed as untenable and logically fl awed since it 
got involved in the pernicious dialectics of Inhalt and Umfang.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next two sections we recall the 
basics of the accounts of Begriffstheorie of Schlick and Cassirer. This requires 
dealing with  Helmholtz’s theory of concepts in some detail. In section 3 we will 
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deal with  Marc-Wogau’s critique of Cassirer’s Begriffstheorie and Cassirer’s 
counter-critique in some detail. In section 4 I put forward some arguments from 
modern Formal Theory of Concepts which show that Marc-Wogau’s objections to 
Cassirer’s Begriffstheorie are untenable. This does not mean that  Cassirer’s rich 
constitutive account of concepts was without problems, but at least it shows that 
there is no reason to suspect that every theory of concepts that subscribes to some 
kind of relation between Inhalt and Umfang is per se inconsistent. In section 5 we 
conclude with some general remarks on the complex relations between the Logical 
Empiricism of the Vienna Circle, the Marburg Neokantianism, and the Uppsala 
School as they show up in the debate on Begriffstheorie.
1. KNOWLEDGE AS COORDINATION: HELMHOLTZ AND SCHLICK
The term Begriff is probably one of the most vague terms ever-used in philoso-
phy, psychology, and other disciplines (cf.  Weitz 1984, Marc-Wogau 1936). One 
cannot start with a neat and comprehensive defi nition. In this paper I propose to 
conceive Begriffstheorie as a result of two complementary infl uences: On the one 
hand, it may be understood as a result of post-Kantian epistemology, which no 
longer accepted Kantian “pure intuitions” as an important apriori ingredient for 
scientifi c knowledge. On the other hand, Begriffstheorie may be seen as a philo-
sophical reaction of the conceptual evolution of the sciences, i.e., it was an attempt 
of philosophy to come to terms with the new conceptual developments of the sci-
ences, in particular with those of logic, mathematics, the mathematized empirical 
sciences. Also insights of physiology and psychology that concerned the ways of 
human conceptualization required the attention of philosophy.
A convenient starting point is Helmholtz’s “semiotic” theory of knowledge 
(cf. Helmholtz 1921).  Helmholtz considered himself as a (Neo)Kantian, moreover 
he was a fi rst-class scientist with an immense expertise in physics, physiology and 
other disciplines. Helmholtz’s epistemology may be characterized as a rather spe-
cial version of a “scientifi cally corrected” Kantianism. According to it, on one side 
there is the world W of Kantian things-in-themselves, on the other side there is the 
domain S of one’s sensations. Things and sensations are correlated to each other in 
a 1-1-way in such that sensations are to be interpreted as signs of objects:
Our sensations are precisely effects produced by external causes in our organs, and the 
manner in which one such effect expresses itself depends, of course, essentially on the type 
of apparatus which is affected. Insofar as the quality of our sensation gives us information 
about the peculiarity of the external infl uence stimulating it, it can pass for a sign – but not 
for an image. For one requires from an image some sort of similarity with the object im-
aged: … A sign, however, need not have any type of similarity with which it is a sign for. 
The relations between the two are so restricted that the same object, taking effect under 
equal cir cum stances, produces the same sign, and hence unequal signs always cor res pond 
to unequal effects.” (Helmholtz 1878, 347)
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Knowledge, then, is based on a mapping W f S of the world W of 
things-in-themselves into the domain S of sensations satisfying the requirement 
f(x) ≠ f(y)  x ≠ y. According to  Helmholtz, this weakly “structure-preserving” 
relation between an outer world and a domain of inner sensations is suffi cient to 
ensure that we are able to know the lawful structure of reality (cf. Helmholtz 1878, 
348). In his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre  Schlick, in general, faithfully followed 
Helmholtz’s semiotic approach.2 A point where he deviated from Helmholtz was 
that he replaced  “sensations” by “concepts”. The reason was that he considered 
“sensations” or “mental images” as too vague and unde ter mined as that they could 
fulfi l the symbolic role that Helmholtz had provided for them. In order to ensure 
stability and determinateness of our thought, he proposed to replace Helmholtz’s 
sensory images (Empfi ndungen) by “concepts”. Concepts were distinguished from 
images by the fact that they were completely determined and had nothing uncer-
tain about them (cf. GTK, §5, 20). One may ask, how natural minds like ours with 
their continuously changing sensory images can handle such ideal entities as con-
cepts as Schlick defi ned them. Schlick offered an answer apparently inspired by 
Vaihinger’s Philosophie des Als Ob: Strictly speaking, concepts do not exist, what 
is important is their functional role:
We operate with concepts as if they were (sensory) images (Vorstellungen) with exa c tly de-
lineated pro per ties that can always be re-cognized with absolute certainty. Their pro perties 
are called the characteristics or features (Merkmale) of the concept, and are laid down by 
means of specifi c stipulations which in their totality constitute the defi nition of the con cept. 
In logic, the totality of the characteristics of a concept is called its “in tension” (or “con-
tent”); the set of objects denoted by the concept is called its “ex tension.
…
Accordingly, a concept plays the role of a sign for all those objects whose properties include 
all defi ning characteristics of that concept.” (GTK, §5, 20)
For later use it will be expedient to comment briefl y on this piece of traditional 
concept logic to which Schlick subscribes here. In traditional logic a concept has 
two complementary components: on the one hand, its Inhalt (intension), given as 
the set of its defi ning characteristics, and on the other hand its Umfang (“exten-
sion”), given as the set of all objects whose properties include all its defi ning 
characteristics. This duality suggests the so-called “law of reciprocity” (cf.  Marc-
Wogau 1936, 10ff) according to which the following “reciprocity” between the 
Inhalt and the Umfang of a concept holds: the larger the Inhalt of a concept, the 
smaller its Umfang, and vice versa. This time-honoured “law” of traditional logic 
2 In an approving comment on Helmholtz’s The Facts of Perception Schlick explicitly 
characterized his Ge n eral Theory of Knowledge as an attempt “to show that form-
ing such a mapping of what is lawlike in the actual, with the help of a sign system, 
altogether constitutes the essence of all knowledge, and that therefore our cog ni tive 
process can only in this way fulfi l its task and needs no other method for doing so.” 
(Schlick and Hertz 1921, 166, endnote 15)
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appears in various forms in virtually every logical treatise of the 19th and early 20th 
century. As will be discussed later in more detail, it is the target of  Marc-Wogau’s 
incisive criticism put forward in Inhalt und Umfang. More precisely, he contended 
that all accounts of Begriffstheorie that hold some version of the reciprocity law 
were doomed to be inconsistent.
Before we come to this, let us note that the project of defi ning concepts by 
characteristic features is threatened by two complementary dangers, either by infi -
nite regress or ending up in some features that lack exact defi nitions but instead are 
grounded in some murky empirical intuition that undermined the exact character 
of concepts so defi ned. According to  Schlick, it was  Hilbert’s account of implic-
itly defi ned concepts that provided a way out of this impasse. According to it the 
basic concepts of mathematical theories are just defi ned as entities that satisfy the 
axioms specifi ed for them. Hence, there seem to be at least some concepts that can 
be defi ned in a completely precise and unambiguous way. Let us assume, for the 
sake of the argument, that we possess concepts in Schlick’s sense that are coor-
dinated in a 1-1-way with objects. What is the purpose in coordinating concepts 
to objects? Schlick’s answer in Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre is that coordinations 
enable us to make judgments about objects, and only 1-1-coordinations enable us 
to make true judgments (cf. GTK, § 10). This answer is un satisfying in that it still 
allows a “Lagadonian coordination”3 of concepts and objects that co or dinates each 
object with one concept in a 1-1-way in some arbitrary fashion. Such a Lagadon-
ian con cep tual system would allow us to make true judgments in a trivial manner. 
In order to exclude such undesired conceptual systems, Schlick hastened to add 
that the real aim of coordinating objects and concepts is not simply to enable us 
to for mulate true judgments but to get knowledge, which depends on very special 
coordinations:
Knowledge is more – much more – than mere truth. Truth requires nothing but uniqueness 
of coordination; as far as truth is concerned, it does not matter what sign is used for that 
purpose. Knowledge, on the other hand, means unique coor di na tion with the help of certain 
defi nite sym bols, namely, those that have already found applications elsewhere. … Hence 
if we were to coordinate a special sign to each fact and object in the world, we should have 
nothing but isolated truths, each of which would have to be learned se parately. … Our truths 
would be nothing but discrete points, so to speak; they would not form a coherent system. 
Yet it is only in such a system that knowledge is possible, since the fi nding anew of one 
thing in another presupposes a pervasive in ter connection. (GTK, 66, 67, dt. 97)
Thus, an essential point of a Schlickian Begriffstheorie would have been to dis-
tinguish bet ween “good” and “not so good” conceptual coordinations. This issue, 
however, remained underdeveloped in Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. Schlick was 
content to give some vague hints pointing at a sort of Machian thought economy 
3 On the philosophical appeal of Lagadonian languages see D. Lewis On the Plurality of 
Worlds (Lewis 1986, p. 145).
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by which we could single out “good” parsimonious from “bad” Lagadonian con-
cepts.
Summarizing we may say that Schlick’s coordinative account of knowledge 
is characterized by two complementary features: on the one hand it was based 
on a rich notion of structured re ality that did not only recognize “simple” objects 
as real, but even the most “theoretical” re la tions; on the other hand, it ascribed 
a rather austere role to the conceptualizing activity of the subject: for  Schlick, 
concepts were nothing but conventional 1-1 coor di nations that allow easy “syn-
tactical” manipulations. Thereby his account claimed a neat separation between 
factual and conventional components of knowledge. As we shall see,  Cassirer’s 
Begriffstheorie pulled in the opposite direction: although based on co or di na tion 
as well, it emphasized the active role of the conceptualizing subject against that of 
reality “out there”.
2. CONCEPTUAL CONSTITUTION: CASSIRER’S BEGRIFFSTHEORIE
Cassirer’s philosophy of science is concept-orien ted par excellence: “The theory 
of the concept becomes a cardinal problem of systematic philosophy. It be comes 
the nub around which logic, epistemology, philosophy of language and cog nitive 
psychology are rotating” (Cassirer 1928, 163). Since Substance and Function 
(Cassirer 1910) he conceived phi losophy of science as a theory of the formation of 
scientifi c concepts. His theory was natu ra lis tic in the sense that according to him 
philosophy should not decree what scientifi c concepts were and how they worked. 
Rather, since scientifi c concepts evolved in the history of science, it was the task 
of philosophy of science to study this conceptual development of science and to 
make philosophical sense of it, not to legislate it according to some preconceived 
philosophical ideas.
The role concepts played in the evolution of scientifi c knowledge science ac-
cording to Cassirer’s Begriffstheorie may be described in telegram style as fol-
lows. Scientifi c knowledge does not cognize objects as ready-made entities. Rath-
er, knowledge is organized objectually in the sense that in the continuous stream of 
experience invariant relations are fi xated. The unity of a concept is not to be found 
in a fi xed group of pro perties, but in a rule, which lawfully represents the mere 
di ver sity of experiences as a sequence of ele ments. The meaning of a concept de-
pends on the system of concepts in which it oc curs. It is not completely determined 
by one single system, but rather by the con tinuous series of systems unfolding 
in the course of history. Scientifi c concepts and conceptual systems do not yield 
pictures of reality, rather, they provide guide lines for the conceptualisation of the 
world. The fun damental concepts of theoretical physics are blueprints for possi-
ble ex pe ri ences. Factual and theoretical components of scientifi c knowledge can-
not be neatly se pa rated. In a scientifi c theory „real“ and „non-real“ components 
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are inex tri cab ly interwoven. Not a single concept is confronted with re a li ty but 
a whole sys tem of con cepts. Our experience is always conceptually structured. 
There is no non-con cep tually structured „given“. The „given“ is an artifact of a 
bad meta physics.
The concepts of mathematics and the concepts of the empirical sciences are 
essentially of the same kind. In a similar way, as the objects of a mathematical 
theory are constituted by a system of concepts, the objects of an empirical theory 
are constituted by theory’s concepts. With this account of scientifi c concepts and 
their role in the ongoing evolution of science  Cassirer goes beyond  Helmholtz’s 
and  Schlick’s structural realist accounts of knowledge and coordination. He em-
phasized the “constitutive” character of symbolic representation:
… we do not know “objects” as if they were already independently determined and given as 
objects, – but we know objectively, by producing certain limitations and by fi xating certain 
permanent elements and connections within the uniform fl ow of experience.  The concept 
of the object in this sense constitutes no ultimate limit of knowledge, but is rather the funda-
mental in stru ment, by which all that has become its permanent possession is expressed and 
established. The object marks the logical possession of know ledge, and not a dark beyond 
forever removed from knowledge. “(SF, 303f)
Instead of conceiving knowledge as a structure-preserving map between a world 
of trans cen dent things on the one hand and a domain of sensory images (Helm-
holtz) or con ventional sym bols (Schlick), for Cassirer knowledge as coordination 
meant the co or di nation of dif fe rent areas or stages of knowledge. This led to a 
new “internal” account of coordination or re presentation that described the coor-
dination between thought and reality not as a relation be tween two ontologically 
different spheres but as a relation between different areas of know ledge. Thus, if 
one graphically represents Schlick’s and Helmholtz’s account by a simple relation 
W S between a world W of transcendent things and a domain of internal 
symbols S, Cassirer’s account could perhaps be represented by an unending chain 
of conceptualizations evolving in the history of science:
… Ci Ci+1 Ci+2 …
Here, the Ci should not be interpreted as “mere conceptua li za tions”. Rather, the Ci 
are always thought to aim at empirical confi rmation and corroboration. In modern 
terms, they may perhaps be conceived as interpreted models of reality. Thus, a 
scientifi c object is never “given as such”, independently of all the Ci, it always 
appears in a lawful conceptual context by which it is constituted. In a similar way 
as a ma the matical object such as a geometrical point cannot be thought outside a 
geometrical system, an object of physics or of any other science cannot be thought 
outside its theoretical context to which it belongs. Indeed, Cassirer considered it as 
the essential task of critical idealist phi lo so phy of science to make clear “that the 
same foun da ti o nal syntheses (Grund syn thesen) on which logic and ma thematics 
rest also govern the scientifi c con struction of exp e ri en tial know ledge …” (Cassirer 
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1907, p. 44). This contention did not imply that empirical and mathe ma ti cal ob -
jects and concepts are one and the same thing. In Substance and Function he 
pointed out there was an important difference between mathematics and empirical 
concepts:
In contrast to the mathematical concept, however, in empirical science the cha rac te ris tic 
difference emerges that the construction which within ma the ma tics arrives at a fi xed end, 
remains in prin ciple incompleteable  with in ex pe rience. But no mat ter, how many „strata“ 
of relations we may super im pose on each other, and how ever close we may come to all 
particular cir cum stances of the real process, never the less there is always the pos si bility that 
some co-op e rative factor in the total re sult has not been calculated and will only dis covered 
with the further pro gress of ex perimental analysis. Cas si rer (1910/1953, p. 254)
In a nutshell, then, for  Cassirer the difference between mathematical and empirical 
concepts re sided in the fact that the latter are open (“incompleteable”) while the 
former are closed: the implicit defi nition of a point in Euclidean geometry fi xes 
the meaning of this concept once and for all. In contrast, the meaning of a concept 
such as “atom” is never fi xed by a single conceptual system. Cas sirer claimed that 
the key concepts of empirical science had a “serial form” (“Reihen form”) in that 
their meaning was not fi xed once and for all by a single theoretical frame work. 
Rather, it emerged in a series of theoretical stages in the ongoing evolution of 
scien ti fi c know ledge. Thus concepts comprise two complementary moments: on 
the one hand they are rules for further investigations, on the other hand they are 
devices for determining the objects of scientifi c knowledge. The feasibility of this 
complex relation of the two com po nents is at stake in the debate between Cassirer 
and  Marc-Wogau.
3. MARC-WOGAU’S CRITICISM AND CASSIRER’S DEFENSE
The aim of Marc-Wogau’s treatise Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs. Beitrag zur 
Theorie des Begriffs (1936) was to clarify the es sence of the concept of concept. 
According to him, such a clarifi cation was urgently needed, since vir tu ally all 
extant accounts of Begriffstheorie were fatally fl awed. As an expe di ent starting 
point for such a clarifi cation he considered the problem of the relation between 
the Inhalt and the Umfang of a concept: “It seems to me that the nature of concept 
can best be clarifi ed at this problem.” (Marc-Wogau 1936, 5). He pointed out that 
in the theory of con cepts one easily runs into logical diffi culties. For instance, the 
“concept of concept” (der Be griff des Begriffs) immediately leads to well-known 
paradoxes of a class that contains itself as an ele ment. Hence, in order to avoid 
such pitfalls one had to be extremely careful in the choice of the basic assumptions 
on which to build a consistent Begriffstheorie. Con se quent ly, Marc-Wo gau was 
prepared to recognize only those “determinations” (Bestimmt heiten) as concepts 
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which were non-contradictory (widerspruchslos) or unequivocal (eindeutig) and 
could be grasped by a uniform (einheitlich) thought (ibid., 7). Thereby he hoped 
to exclude inconsistent expressions such as “round square” from the realm of 
Begriffstheorie.  Although it is rather plausible not to admit openly contradictory 
concepts such as “being red and non-red all over at the same time”  Marc-Wogau’s 
requirement of uniformity is more tricky, in particular, since he considered non-
uniformity as the main source of “dialectical”, i.e., incon sis tent concepts. Accord-
ing to him, virtually all theories of concepts sinned against the com mand of uni-
formity and fell prey to inconsistency. The main entrance door for non-uniformity 
(and thence inconsistency) was that virtually all theories of concepts subscribed to 
a correlation between Inhalt and Umfang of a concept. Marc-Wogau claimed that 
this correlation could not be grasped in a “uniform thought” and therefore led to 
an inconsistent “double thought” (Doppelgedanken).
He attempted to show that all accounts of Begriffstheorie endorsed a very 
strong version of the reciprocity law according to which the Inhalt uniquely de-
termined the Umfang and the Umfang uniquely determined the Inhalt. This claim 
may well be doubted. For instance, a non-extensional Begriffstheorie readily al-
lows for the existence of concepts having the same Umfang but different Inhalte. 
Fortunately, we need not go into the details of these quibbles when we wish to 
grasp the essence of Cassirer’s and Marc-Wogau’s dispute.  Cassirer intended to 
refute Marc-Wogau principally, i.e., he readily admitted that he did subscribe to a 
“double thought” approach of concept. But he denied that this led to contradiction. 
Hence he argued that even if Inhalt and Umfang determined each other in the strict 
way that Marc-Wogau assumed, even then this fact would not lead to inconsist-
ency. In the following I want to show that Cassirer was right, even if the argument 
he presented for this thesis, was less than convincing.
In some sense, Marc-Wogau’s arguments against the “double thought” hidden 
in the standard approaches of Begriffstheorie resemble those of the British ideal-
ists such as  Bradley who claimed that the concept of relation was “unintelligible” 
and even “contradictory”. As Marc-Wogau put it:
If one relatum of this relation (between Inhalt and Umfang) is thought, thereby the other is 
thought as well. Consequently, the relata coincide. If A is to be related to B in such a way 
that A obtains its determination (or determinateness) only through B, then it is impossible 
to distinguish between A and B. They coincide.” (Theoria 2, 291ff)
Let us call this thesis Marc-Wogau’s identity thesis. Cassirer’s counter-argument 
against the identity thesis was to give a counter-example, i.e., he presented a de-
cent, scientifi cally recognized relation whose relata strictly determined each other 
but nevertheless were not identical. Thus his strategy was based on the naturalist 
assumption that it is not the task of philosophy to decree what is possible and what 
is not pos sible but to understand the conceptual evolution of the sciences. Ac-
cording to him, there was no reason to assume that “thinking together” Inhalt and 
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Umfang led to contradiction since the conceptual evolution of science had shown 
that relations whose relata are different but nevertheless strictly determine each 
other, do not lead to contradictions. In other words, he accused  Marc-Wogau of 
being caught in the trap of some unfounded philosophical pre ju dice refuted by the 
conceptual evolution of science.
In order to refute Marc-Wogau’s identity thesis  Cassirer relied on Schlick’s 
Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, and pointed out that systems of implicitly defi ned 
concepts as considered by  Schlick refute Marc-Wogau’s thesis:
 
In an implicitly defi ned conceptual system there is given a to ta li ty of concepts that stand 
in strict correlation to each other and have no in de pen dent content outside this correlation. 
None of them is meaningful “for itself”, each is defi ned only with respect to the other, or, 
better said, with respect to the whole sys tem. Nevertheless this mutual dependence cannot 
be considered as a fl aw; rather it lays the foundation for a certain highly characteristic ad-
van tage. One can not say that, due to the fact that none of the system’s basic concepts can be 
exp lained or used meaningfully outside the system, their meaning dis ap pears or becomes 
ambiguous. Each has its well-determined place in the system and there by it distinguishes 
itself from any other concept of the system. (Cassirer 1938, 226)
He concluded that thereby Marc-Wogau’s thesis was “directly refuted” (ibid.).
Even if from a formal point of view Cassirer’s argument against Marc-Wogau 
seems fl awless, one may consider it not as fully con vincing: fi rstly, it is an abstract 
argument in the sense in that it has no thing to do with the specifi cs of the reciproc-
ity law that correlates Inhalt and Umfang. It sim ply gives an example showing 
that there exist relata that strictly determine each other with out being identical. 
Secondly, the argument based on implicitly defi ned concepts does not provide any 
positive evidence for Cassirer’s own version of a constitutive Begriffs theorie. In 
the next section I want to show that today we have powerful formal tools that al-
low one to refute Marc-Wogau’s thesis on his own ground. That is to say, there are 
consistent theories of concepts that satisfy a strong version of the reciprocity law. 
4. FORMAL THEORY OF CONCEPTS AND ADJOINT SITUATIONS
Cassirer’s refutation of Marc-Wogau’s identity thesis by invoking implicit defi -
nitions may not be considered as fully adequate, since the implicit defi nition of 
concepts has nothing to do with the problematic of the relation between Inhalt 
and Umfang that occupies centre stage in Marc-Wogau’s Begriffstheorie. In other 
words, Cassirer’s argument is too general than to be really convincing.
Fortunately, today better and more specifi c arguments are available to back 
up Cassirer’s arguments against Marc-Wogau. I’d like to mention two different 
approaches. First, the so-called Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) inaugurated in 
the 1980s by the German mathematician Rudolf  Wille and his collaborators. Sec-
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ondly, on a more general level, the theory of adjoint situations that belongs to the 
core of the foundational discipline of category theory founded in the late 1940s 
by the American mathematicians Saunders  Mac Lane and Samuel  Eilen berg. Both 
approaches offer mathematical models of (generalized) concepts that are better 
suited to refute  Marc-Wogau’s identity thesis than  Cassirer’s vague allusion to 
Schlick’s equally vague theory of implicit defi nitions in Allgemeine Erkenntnis-
lehre.
FCA starts with the reciprocity law. A concept is determined by its extent 
(“Umfang”) and its intent (“Inhalt”). The extent consists of all objects belonging 
to the concepts, while the intent is the collection of all attributes shared by the 
objects. As it is often diffi cult to list all the objects and usually impossible to list 
all its attributes, it is natural to work within a specifi c context in which the sets of 
objects and attributes are fi xed.4
Then a context is defi ned as a triple (G, M, F) where G and M are sets and F 
G × M. The elements of G are called objects, and the elements of M are called 
attributes. If (g, m) F this is to be interpreted as the fact that in M the object g has 
the attribute m, or, put it dif fe rently that the attribute m is instantiated by g. For A 
G and B M defi ne
I(A) := {m  M; for all g  A (g, m)  F}
U(B) := {g  G; for all m  B (g, m)  F}
Informally, I(A) is the set of attributes common to all the objects in A, and U(B) 
is the set of objects having all the attributes in B. Denoting the power set of A and 
B by PA and PB, the operators I and U just defi ned above may be conceived as 
mappings
PA I PB  and PB U PA
These mappings have some interesting properties. For instance, they satisfy the 
following requirements (cf.  Ganter and  Wille 1999, chapter 0.4, Defi nition 16, 
11):
(1) A1  A2  I(A1)  I(A2)
(2)  B1  B2  U(A1)  U(B2)
(3)  A  U(I(A)) and B  I(U(B))
The pair (I, U) is called a Galois connection, and the maps I and U are called du-
ally adjoint to each other. As is well known a pair of maps PA I PB and 
PB U PA is a Galois connection if and only if it satisfi es the equivalence
(4)  A  U(B)  B  I(A)
Now we are ready to defi ne concepts of a context (G, M, F) as pairs (A, B)  PG 
x PM that are “balanced” in the sense that I(A) = B and U(B) = A. The Umfang 
4 If this is not done, one runs into diffi culties, as is discussed in detail by Marc-Wogau 
(1936).
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of the concept (A, B) is A while its Inhalt is B. The set of concepts C(G, M, F) := 
{(A, B); I(A) = B} has the structure of a complete lattice (cf. Theorem 3, p. 20, 
 Ganter and  Wille 1999).
By defi nition, Umfang and Inhalt of a concept strictly determine each other. 
Nevertheless they are different. But given the Inhalt I one can calculate the Um-
fang U, and, vice versa, given the Umfang U, one can calculate the Inhalt I. For A 
 PG and B  PM) one obtains:
U(B) = {A; B ≤ I(A)} and I(A) = {B; A ≤ U(B)}
In sum, the Galois connection (I, U) neatly disproves  Marc-Wogau’s identity the-
sis according to which strict mutual determination im plies identity. Moreover, the 
refuting example is directly concerned with Inhalt and Umfang as key concepts of 
Begriffstheorie.
By briefl y mentioning FCA and the theory of Galois con nections I only 
scratched at the surface of what may be charac te rized as a modern version of tra-
ditional Begriffstheorie. In this direction much more has to be done in order to fi nd 
out if traditional Begriffstheorie could indeed be fruitfully related to contemporary 
strands of research in category theory, computer science and cognitive science.
It would be a gross underestimation of the theory of Galois connections to take 
it just as an abstruse calculus that is useful for some special theory such as FCA. 
Rather, Galois connections are a very special case of so called Adjoint Situations. 
Adjoint situations are, according to the assessment of Saunders  Mac Lane, one 
of the founding fathers of category theory, THE fundamental concept of category 
theory. There is no time to explain this contention in any detail. Be it suffi cient 
just to state that in adjoint situations the rather austere structures PG and PM are 
replaced by appropriate, much more richly structures cate go ries, and the role of 
the mappings I and U is taken over by appropriate functors these categories. Then 
one of the fundamental theorems of category theory, the so-called Adjoint Functor 
Theorem, ensures that under certain conditions something like a generalization of 
the reciprocity law holds.
Painting it with a broad brush we may contend that in this way the allegedly 
obsolete Begriffs theorie of the early 20th century, centering on the notorious “law 
of reciprocity”, has found an unexpected come back in the guise of category theo-
ry. The fact that adjoint situations are one of the core concepts of category theory, 
and the fact that category theory is one of the most successful contemporary foun-
dational theories suggest that even today Begriffstheorie may deserve more than 
mere philosophico-historical interest.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Begriffstheorie may be considered as hidden meeting point for a variety of philo-
sophical currents more or less closely related to some sort of “scientifi c” philoso-
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phy, in particular Logical Empiricism, among them  Schlick’s empirio-criticism 
of the early 20s,  Cassirer’s critical idealism, and the logical philosophy of the 
Uppsala School. More generally, as  Marc-Wogau’s treatise Inhalt und Umfang 
shows the issue of Be griffs theorie was a common ground for the various cur-
rents of analytic and continental philosophy that in the following decades became 
neatly separated. Begriffs theorie was a topic where philosophers of quite different 
orientations met. It exemplifi es that once upon a time philosophers, who today 
are classifi ed as belonging to allegedly quite different traditions, were engaged in 
discussing similar problems. Begriffstheorie shows in particular that it would be a 
serious distorsion to characterize the continental tradition as anti-logical, and the 
analytical tradition as pro-logical.
From Marc-Wogau’s perspective the theories of concepts put forward by phi-
losophers such as Cassirer,  Frege,  Husserl,  Kant,  Rickert,  Russell, and others, all 
appeared to be rather similar, since they all suffered from similar defects. He treat-
ed them as united in the com mon endeavor of elucidating the nature of (scientifi c) 
concepts. Implicitly he thereby defi ed the sharp distinction between continental 
and analytic philosophy that later be came current. This feature of Begriffstheorie 
would have deserved more attention as I could give to it in a short paper like this. 
Rather, I concentrated on Begriffstheorie as a common ground of the more closely 
related currents of Cassirer’s critical idealism and Schlick’s early logical Empiri-
cism as presented in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre.
From Marc-Wogau’s rigid conception of logic that did not al low one “to think 
together” the complementary aspects Inhalt and Umfang, both Cassirer’s and 
Schlick’s accounts of Begriffstheorie were untenable. Lo gically, Marc-Wogau’s 
criticism is refuted by the existence of concepts that mutually de ter mine each other 
without being identical. Pragmatically, Marc-Wogau’s account of Begriffstheorie 
is unacceptable, since it is hard to see how scientifi c concepts could do the work 
they are designed to do without assuming the existence of some kind of relation be -
t ween two components of concepts that more or less resemble the classical aspects 
of Inhalt and Umfang. Summing up one may say that Cassirer’s Begriffstheorie 
survives Marc-Wogau’s assault since his argument against “dual” accounts of con-
cepts is fatally fl awed. This is not to say that Cassirer’s rich “constitutive” account 
of Begriffstheorie did not suffer from its own problems. But that is another story.
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